



THE “MISSED CHANCE” FOR U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS, 1975-1979

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Mr. Minister, let's leave aside the issues that divide us. Let us go outside and jointly declare to the press that we have decided to normalize relations.

– U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke to
Vietnamese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Phan Hien, May 3 or 4, 1977¹

When the victorious Communist armies broke into Saigon on April 30, 1975, jubilant crowds thronged the streets of northern Vietnamese cities to celebrate the arrival of lasting peace after 34 years of near-continuous warfare. They were mistaken. The late 1970s saw the radical Communists in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, attempt to regain by force territories lost to Vietnam in the 16th-19th centuries, eventually prompting a Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia from 1978 to 1989. As the Khmer Rouge's ideological ally and fearing encirclement by a Vietnam-Soviet axis, China undertook a punitive expedition into northern Vietnam from February 17 to March 16, 1979, with sporadic fighting lasting until 1990. While publicly calling for peace, the U.S. secretly funded the Cambodian guerrilla resistance against the Vietnamese occupation and coordinated highly restrictive international sanctions. Coupled with misguided economic policies at home, these external pressures succeeded in keeping Vietnam one of the poorest countries in the world, dependent wholly on Soviet bloc aid. It was not until 1995, well after the end of the Cold War, that the U.S. and Vietnam exchanged embassies for the first time, an important step in Vietnam's reemergence in the world economy.

But could these “lost decades” for U.S.-Vietnam relations have been avoided? Edwin Martini and Luu Van Loi both argue that there was still too much distrust between the two sides for rapprochement.² However, the majority of scholars including Nayan Chanda, Tran Nam Tien, Grant

Evans and Kevin Rowley, Steven Hurst, Evelyn Colbert, and Cecile Menetrey-Monchau point out that while relations remained icy between Vietnam and the Ford Administration, both the Vietnamese government and the Carter Administration came tantalizingly close to normalization in 1977-78.³ For these proponents of what I term the “Missed Chance” thesis, the greatest puzzle is actually why Vietnam and the U.S. *did not* establish diplomatic relations in these early postwar years. Why did the Vietnamese side initially insist on making normalization and their provision of data on American soldiers missing-in-action contingent upon American war reparations, which the U.S. side would never accept? By the time the Vietnamese negotiating position softened in mid-1978, the Carter Administration had become determined to delay normalization with Vietnam until after normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China. While the U.S. had obvious strategic reasons to prioritize China over Vietnam, it is less clear why the two processes were incompatible, as China never sought to prevent U.S.-Vietnam rapprochement and China itself maintained diplomatic relations with Vietnam until the Sino-Vietnamese War. Was normalization with Vietnam merely temporarily delayed for decorum’s sake, or had the Americans by then decided to push China into a collision course with Vietnam, as the Vietnamese and Soviets later alleged? The possibility that had U.S.-Vietnam normalization been secured, it could have opened up a channel for U.S. engagement with Vietnam during the series of crises of late 1978 – early 1979 and even help resolve these crises makes the mysteries surrounding the “Missed Chance” thesis particularly compelling.

This short but ambitious paper explores why and how both the Carter Administration and the Vietnamese government made genuine efforts towards and yet failed to secure normalization of relations in the 1970s. Drawing on recently released and compiled Vietnamese and American documents, memoirs, and news articles, among others, I hope to refine the “Missed Chance” thesis. I argue that Vietnam’s overriding quest to quickly reconstruct its economy and consolidate unified statehood made rapprochement with the U.S. necessary. Yet, it was this very imperative that drove

them to insist on American reparations and ultimately miss their chance for normalization in 1977. By mid-1978, the threat of geostrategic encirclement by China finally prompted Vietnamese leaders to seek unconditional normalization. However, in early 1978 the Ogaden War and the Truong Dinh Hung spying affair had greatly augmented Carter's wariness towards Soviet and Vietnamese ambitions and consequently elevated the influence of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski over Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. While this meant that normalization of relations with Vietnam was placed on lower priority to normalization with China, the evidence suggests that it remained on the table until the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia indefinitely delayed the process. The window for normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations only truly passed when Vietnamese leaders realized in early 1979 that they could not abandon the fledgling People's Republic of Kampuchea which they had set up, setting the stage for Cambodia to become "Vietnam's Vietnam".

New beginnings

For the Vietnamese government, the two most important postwar objectives were the consolidation of independent statehood and economic reconstruction. Their linkage was made clear by deceased Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh's often-quoted warning: "As long as we still have to ask for food assistance from outside, we cannot say that we have complete independence and freedom."⁴ Its victory on the battlefield both elevated the government's self-confidence and lessened its reliance on Soviet and Chinese patronage, giving the attainment of these old aspirations a greater urgency. General Secretary Le Duan, in his euphoric address to the nation on the first Tet festival after reunification, promised that within five years the theretofore nonexistent Vietnamese mechanized industry would churn out radio sets and refrigerators. "Never before has our future looked so bright as now." he declared. "Never before have the Vietnamese people's lives been so happy as now."⁵ The

IV Congress of the rechristened Vietnamese Communist Party (December 14-20, 1976) codified these objectives in an ambitious Second Five Year Plan, calling for sustained GNI growth of 13-14%/annum. This was to be achieved even while shifting the North from a wartime into a peacetime economy, completely dismantling the capitalist economy and society of the South, and comprehensively integrating these hitherto separate economies under a single command economy.⁶

While on the surface Vietnam's Second Five-Year Plan appeared to emulate the rapid industrialization of past socialist experiments in China and the Soviet Union, there was one crucial difference. Development in Vietnam would be predicated not solely on the autarkic Stakhanovite spirit of the masses, but also on raising 30 billion *dong* (around U.S. \$12.9 billion) in capital investments and access to foreign technology.⁷ Vietnam had no significant indigenous capital stock, so this money must come from outside, either as investment or aid. Right before the Party Congress, Deputy Prime Minister Do Muoi made a grand tour of Moscow (11/22-12/4) and Beijing (12/5-12/6) to enlist support for the Plan. The Soviets promised him a paltry 3 billion *dong* for the Second Five-Year Plan and 4 billion *dong* for the Third, answering Do Muoi's entreaties with the promise to "do further research on [his] requests."⁸ Perhaps precisely because he chose to go to Moscow first, Beijing proved even more of a disappointment. Chinese Vice-Premier Gu Mu complained at length about the disruptions on the Chinese economy wrought by natural disasters, the Cultural Revolution, and being inundated with requests from "other brotherly Third World countries, who are fighting on the front lines against imperialism and hegemonism [Chinese shorthand for the West and Soviet Union, respectively]." Premier Hua Guofeng concluded that "because our resources are limited, our ability to provide aid is limited as well."⁹ In the subsequent formal negotiations in February 1977, China offered just 100 million *renminbi* (~U.S.\$50 million) in zero-interest loans.¹⁰ Clearly, with the war over, Vietnam was no longer a priority for Soviet and Chinese funding. This new data on Chinese and Soviet assistance that I have discovered in Vietnamese archives shows Steven Hurst's widely accepted

estimate that Chinese and Soviet aid covered about half of Vietnam's needs to have grossly understated the shortfall – and consequently, Vietnam's desperation for new sources of capital stock.¹¹

That the Politburo chose to push ahead with its 30 billion *dong* figure anyways speaks of their postwar aspiration and hallucination in equal measure. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh laid out how the Plan would be implemented on the foreign policy front:

The international situation is basically favorable and our international position and reputation has been elevated, opening up promising prospects for developing international cooperation with our socialist brothers and other countries... From now on, economic relations between ourselves and foreign countries must shift fundamentally from those based mainly on non-refundable aid to mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation; and if we want to increase the import of goods that we really need, then we must quickly build up high-value and high-capacity clearing capabilities.¹²

The “other countries” to which Trinh referred included Japan, France, and the U.K., all of which had previously engaged in military action against the Vietnamese Communists, but have normalized relations following the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973. By 1976, when total trade with the Soviet Union was \$309.2 million, that with Japan already amounted to \$216.5 million, with British-administered Hong Kong \$59.0 million, and with France \$32.8 million.¹³ Vietnam also moved to assure the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments, which had provided extensive support for American forces in Vietnam in fear they would be the next dominoes to fall to Communism, that it only wanted peaceful coexistence. As a result, diplomatic relations were normalized with all five ASEAN countries, culminating in the disbandment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, the poor cousin of NATO in Southeast Asia) in July 1977. Malaysia, in

particular, played a crucial role in helping rebuild the rubber and palm oil industries in Vietnam by sending seeds and experts, and setting up a \$2 million rubber laboratory and training facilities.¹⁴ While repeatedly refusing Soviet invitations to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for fear of being dragged into the Sino-Soviet dispute, in September 1976 the reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam became the first openly Communist member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Monetary Fund when it assumed the former seats and outstanding debts of the Republic of Vietnam in these organizations and the World Bank.¹⁵ And in April 1977, a liberal Foreign Investment Code was promulgated to attract investors with ownership protections and tax breaks.¹⁶

Given how quickly Vietnam was moving to integrate itself into the world economy, reducing its dependence on Soviet and Chinese aid, and reconciling with its former adversaries, normalization with the U.S., too, seemed only a matter of time. Trade and investment from the above countries could only make up for a portion of the shortfall in Soviet and Chinese aid, and ultimately access to American capital was indispensable to realizing the objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan. As long as the Ford Administration remained in power, however, there was little chance of rapprochement. Despite the fact that President Gerald Ford played his lyre while Saigon burned, at least rhetorically Vietnam still considered the U.S. government, especially one still led by ex-President Richard Nixon's leftovers, its primary threat. In Saigon, former Republic of Vietnam officials were rounded up and interrogated in hope of revealing CIA activity.¹⁷ As late as May 1976, a Party directive still cited the danger of American subversion as a rationale for increased military support to Laos.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Party daily *Nhan Dan* continued to condemn American imperialism and predicting the imminent collapse of capitalism at every opportunity, even while reminding Americans of their moral and legal obligation to pay war reparations. On April 16, 1976 *Nhan Dan* and Hanoi Radio published snippets from Nixon's 1973 letter during the final stages of the Paris Peace Agreement, which stated "the U.S.

Government will contribute to the postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions whatsoever”, quoting the figure of “\$3.35 billion in non-refundable aid for a period of five years.”¹⁹ More than just a personal guarantee, the Vietnamese saw this note as a clarification of American obligations pursuant to Article 21 of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement:

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and throughout Indochina.²⁰

If the Vietnamese entertained any hope that the Ford Administration would agree with their interpretation of American obligations, they were sorely disappointed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger denied the existence of Nixon’s letter and declared, not unreasonably, that the Ho Chi Minh Campaign that conquered South Vietnam had made null and void the Paris Peace Agreement, an argument that would be picked up later by the Carter Administration.²¹ Edwin Martini has pointed out the irony that although the U.S. lost the war, it retained a powerful position in the world order, allowing the vanquished unprecedented influence over the fate of the victors. When peace came in 1975, instead of abrogating the Category Z (wartime) embargo against North Vietnam, Kissinger promptly extended it to South Vietnam and Cambodia while freezing all their assets – in effect continuing to treat these nations as belligerents.²² Several important chances at reconciliation were lost as a result, when a proposed trip for American oil executives to visit Hanoi in February 1976 was scuppered, and private humanitarian agencies were subjected to a restrictive export licensing regime. Another sticking point was the U.S.’s repeated vetoing of Vietnam’s entry into the United Nations, even against overwhelming General Assembly votes to reconsider.²³

But even the Ford Administration could not wash its hands of Vietnam so easily. It still needed Vietnam's cooperation to find its missing-in-action personnel, amidst claims that there were live American servicemen still being kept captive in Communist Vietnam (popularly termed the POW/MIA issue). The waning days of the War and its immediate aftermath saw a group led by family members of MIA American personnel rise to prominence on this issue, placing great pressure on U.S. officials to demand Hanoi for a full accounting of its lost servicemen. After meeting with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in December 1975, the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia acknowledged in its Final Report that "because of the nature and circumstances in which many Americans were lost in combat in Indochina, a total accounting by the Indochinese Governments is not possible and should not be expected", while recommending "that the Department of State promptly engage the governments of Indochina in direct discussions aimed at gaining the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans."²⁴ To Vietnamese officials, the sheer absurdity of the American request led to suspicions they only wanted to use the issue to evade their responsibility to provide reparations.²⁵ The Vietnamese would throughout this process fail to fully grasp how, though a red-herring, the American domestic lobby for a full MIA accounting was a potent force, capable of keeping the issue a political football that would affect U.S.-Vietnam relations even up to the 1990s.²⁶

The American presidential election of November 1976, when Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Ford, was to prove a major turning point for the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. As Governor of Georgia, Carter was a Washington outsider untainted by the scandals that had plagued the White House during the Vietnam War era. Although he boasted few foreign policy credentials, Carter's strong Christian morals and emphasis on human rights presented a compelling alternative to Kissinger's *realpolitik*. During his campaign, Carter also made clear that he would seek normalization of relations with Vietnam, as part of incoming Secretary of State Vance's belief that engaging with these nations may allow the U.S. to reduce their dependency on the Soviet Union.²⁷ Thus, despite the lack of progress

towards normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations since the end of the war in 1975, by the time the Carter Administration took office in January 1977 it seemed all the ingredients were at last in place for normalization.

Back to Paris

Demonstrating the high priority of Vietnam on his agenda and eager for his first foreign policy victory, Carter wasted little time once in office. While the embargo remained in place, within the first five months the administration signed off on \$5 million of private humanitarian aid.²⁸ By February 25 Carter had announced plans for a major Presidential delegation to Vietnam to put to bed the MIA/POW claims and put out feelers for normalization. The resultant Woodcock Mission was deliberately composed mainly of politicians who had opposed the Vietnam War, including Senator Mike Mansfield and Congressman G.V. Montgomery. On its trip from March 16 to 20, 1977, Hanoi and Vientiane rolled out the red carpet and Vietnam presented twelve more bodies of American servicemen as a cooperative gesture – a sign of reconciliation quite in contrast to the Khmer Rouge who refused flat out the request for a meeting.²⁹ While “express[ing] a strong desire to move toward normal relations with the U.S.”, Phan Hien initially tried to link the provision of Vietnamese information on POW/MIAs as a bargaining chip to gain American reparations. His position was that since the obligation for Vietnam to provide an MIA accounting was provided for in Article 8b of the Paris Peace Agreement, it only made sense that it be implemented alongside Article 21 and the Nixon letter.³⁰

Sensing the promising meeting devolving into deadlock, Woodcock took Hien aside and explained that Americans would view such a request as “sell[ing] us the remains of our MIAs in return for economic aid”, and reminded Hien that he was “hardly likely to see a more sympathetic delegation

here in many years.” In suggesting that he drop reparations as a condition, Woodcock promised that “further efforts will be made to seek aid for Vietnam later, after normalization.”³¹ After that private meeting, Hien adopted a new line, calling the issues of normalization, MIA accounting, and aid “inter-related”, but that “none of these three issues was a precondition to the other two.” Considering its mission a success, the Woodcock Commission’s Final Report repeated the conclusion of the House Committee that “there is no evidence to indicate that any American POW’s from the Indochina conflict remain alive”, that “normalization of relations affords the best prospect for obtaining a fuller accounting for our missing personnel and recommends that the normalization process be pursued vigorously for this as well as other reasons”.³² Carter received the report with enthusiasm, accepting the Vietnamese invitation to begin normalization talks and making clear “there are no preconditions requested, and there will certainly be no preconditions on our part for these talks in Paris.”³³

The first round of the Paris normalization talks took place between Phan Hien and Richard Holbrooke on May 3-4, 1977, to great fanfare. Holbrooke, who would later become one of America’s most distinguished diplomats and peacemaker in the Dayton Accords 1994 that ended the Bosnia War, was at this time a 36-year-old wunderkind only two months into his stint as Assistant Secretary of State. He had been posted to the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam from 1963-69 and participated in the early rounds of the Paris Peace negotiations, where he and Phan Hien first met. Holbrooke was also one of the most outspoken advocates for normalization of relations with Vietnam, believing that engagement was the only way to draw Vietnam away from the U.S.S.R. and towards ASEAN, the dynamic regional economic bloc that was rapidly becoming one of America’s most important trading partners. And then there was Holbrooke’s no-so-secret ambition to dismiss critics of his youthfulness by bagging the first major diplomatic coup of his office: turning the page on the painful the divisive chapter in American history that was the Vietnam War once and for all.³⁴

It was during this meeting that Holbrooke made Hien the famous offer, reproduced at the beginning of this paper, for unconditional normalization, effective immediately. The U.S. would furthermore withdraw its veto of Vietnam's U.N. membership and lift of the trade embargo as soon as an American embassy is established in Hanoi. To his surprise, Hien replied that normalization can only come with a promise of aid. When Holbrooke reiterated that the American government did not recognize the legality of the Nixon letter and that his maximum offer was for the U.S. government to consider humanitarian aid after normalization had been completed, Hien stood firm. The next day Holbrooke terminated the talks.³⁵

Though publicly spun by Holbrooke as "constructive", that meeting had decidedly failed. Hoping to elicit sympathy from the American public by employing Hanoi's standard approach whenever negotiations stalled, Hien revealed to the American media for the first time that aid was his condition for normalization. This backfired almost immediately as the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly on May 4 to prohibit U.S. officials even to negotiate "reparation, aid, or any other form of payment" to Vietnam.³⁶ On May 6, *Nhan Dan* once again published the Nixon letter, which prompted a furor in the U.S. that eventually forced the State Department to admit to its existence and release its full contents on May 19. But by then, the letter only served to force officials to make profuse assurances that they will not provide aid to Vietnam, quite the opposite of what the Vietnamese had hoped.³⁷ Phan Hien had failed to appreciate how deeply the post-Watergate Congress resented secret deals made by the fallen executive, particularly when it infringed directly on that most sacred power of legislatures – their control over budgets.

The controversy surrounding the publication of the letter clouded over the next round of talks, which were initially scheduled for May 15 but were postponed to June 2. To make things worse, shortly before its commencement, Holbrooke was informed of the discovery of a State Department spy who

was passing information to Hanoi via a California-based Vietnamese-American, David Truong. The negotiations went ahead – Holbrooke had nothing to hide, as he had already made his maximum offer – but the atmosphere was poisoned.³⁸ Hien revealed for the first time the domestic pressures that *he* faced, arguing, “The research department that gave me the list of twenty MIAs [provided in this meeting as a token of goodwill] will ask me what have I come back with”. Holbrooke then suggested that aid could come through different international organizations, but refused to specify the sum.³⁹ Soon after the talks concluded without result, Congress caught wind of this conversation, and the Young Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill was passed by the House on June 22 to prohibit such use of international financial institutions.⁴⁰ This amendment was only withdrawn in September when Carter promised to direct American representatives to veto any loans to Vietnam and six other countries – which it promptly did in the April 1978 ADB session. Thus the last loophole for the Administration to circumvent Congress and provide aid to Vietnam was closed.⁴¹

We know the limits that Congress and public opinion placed on the Carter Administration’s ability to promise aid to Vietnam. But why did Vietnam, having come so close to normalization, remain so obstinate about its demand for aid in the 1977 talks? Steven Hurst puts it down to Hanoi’s Communist worldview, which caused them to believe that since the American capitalists had failed to open up the Vietnamese market by force, they would try to do so by peaceful means. Vietnam could then exploit their supposedly irresistible greed to gain some aid.⁴² Luu Van Loi alleges that Hanoi did not really take prospects of normalization seriously until 1986.⁴³ For Menetrey-Monchau, Vietnam’s insistence on a legally-binding guarantee derived from a lingering distrust that the U.S. would carry through an informal promise.⁴⁴

While all of the above certainly played a role in shaping Hanoi’s negotiating stance, the root cause for them were domestic pressures exerted on Phan Hien by economic planners. As I have

outlined in detail, the Party's main objectives at this time were consolidation and reconstruction. Vietnam's request for funds was not just a matter of foreign policy, but rather the \$3.35 billion had been a crucial part of the \$12.9 billion capital input required for the success of the Five-Year Plan, which in turn embodied all of the Revolution's promises to its people. An important clue for this can be found in the Vietnamese request furnished to the House Committee on Missing Persons in December 1975, which provided detailed tables detailing the exact amounts and values of individual goods to be provided based on the short-lived 1973 Joint Economic Commission study.⁴⁵ Most analysts have concentrated on the legality and politics of the request, overlooking the uncomfortable fact that, given the way command economy accounting works, the Vietnamese had already as good as spent the \$3.35 billion before they received it. While Holbrooke repeatedly urged Hien to consider the limits American democracy placed on his actions, he himself was not sensitive to how Vietnam's own inflexibility at the negotiation table reflected the inflexibility of its command economy.

We should also be careful not to project our perfect hindsight onto Phan Hien. Had Hien known then that within a year and a half Vietnam would be facing a full-scale regional war against Cambodia and China, his response to Holbrooke's proposals would certainly have been much different. But at this time the border conflict with Cambodia was only just heating up again, and the Vietnamese still held out hope for achieving a compromise as they had in 1975. Thus throughout the spring and summer of 1977, with none of the urgency that we would later see in 1978, Phan Hien opted to hold out for a better deal as the Vietnamese had done in 1967, 1968, and 1972.

Too little too late

A series of events starting from summer 1977 gradually modified Vietnam's negotiating position. On July 17, Vietnam concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos that

solidified Vietnamese influence over this country. Their joint communiqué criticized American violation of ASEAN's neutrality, but stated that both sides wanted normalization of relations with the U.S. conditional upon aid being provided.⁴⁶ In May and June 1977, Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed a series of new economic agreements, while China stepped up its aid for the Khmer Rouge. The U.S. did withdraw its veto in the U.N. against Vietnamese membership as a gesture of goodwill, allowing Vietnam to become a full member of the U.N. in September and receiving a loan of \$49 million.⁴⁷ During the induction ceremony the African-American Ambassador Andrew Young expressed his personal support, while Carter invited the new Vietnamese U.N. ambassador Dinh Ba Thi to a luncheon.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, in late April 1977, before the start of the first Hien-Holbrooke talks, the Khmer Rouge had resumed the border conflict with Vietnam, dormant for nearly two years, with a major attack on An Giang province. Sporadic fighting would continue despite Vietnam's offer of a peace summit on June 18, culminating in a particularly bloody Khmer Rouge attack on Tay Ninh in September that escalated the conflict beyond the point of no return. In the dry season of 1977-78, Vietnam undertook a punitive expedition into eastern Cambodia that resulted finally in the suspension of their relations on 12/31/1977.⁴⁹ As the pressure from the Khmer Rouge built up while the U.S. veto of Vietnamese U.N. membership was no longer an issue, towards the end of 1977 there was an incentive for Phan Hien to move more quickly on normalization with the U.S.

It was against this backdrop that Holbrooke and Hien met for the third round of talks on December 7-10. Perhaps sensing that the impending conflict with China and Cambodia will not bode well for normalization, but also doubtful whether aid would be forthcoming once the fighting begins in earnest, the Vietnamese side for the first time offered to normalize relations without formal conditions. The only thing Phan Hien needed was the most informal of pledges that aid would be provided after normalization, telling Holbrooke, "You just whisper in my ear the amount you'll offer and that is enough." Unfortunately, by this time the legislative walls erected over the summer had

severely limited Holbrooke's options, and he could not promise even the removal of the trade embargo, let alone any sort of aid, following normalization. After a further inconclusive meeting on December 19, Holbrooke held out hope for a final convergence of their positions come the next round of talks scheduled in February 1978.⁵⁰

Those talks never took place. On January 31, 1978, David Truong and Robert Humphrey were arrested in connection with the State Department spying affair. A few days later the role of Dinh Ba Thi in channeling the stolen cables was discovered, and the Americans sought to have him extradited from his post in New York, prompting a controversial debate in the U.N. on American privileges as the host nation. While the information that they passed on was of negligible importance, the sensational story did much to undermine trust from both sides. The very fact that Vietnam chose to take such risks at so sensitive a time to peek into the American negotiation agenda belies their hope that Holbrooke might have reserved aid as a bargaining chip. This was regrettably not the case.⁵¹

February and March brought important changes to the Carter Administration's grand strategy. These months saw Cuban troops play a crucial role in the victory of the Soviet-backed Derg in Ethiopia over the American-backed Somalis. With Cuban expeditionary forces once again involved in a brewing conflict in Angola, the Administration feared that Soviet proxies, possibly including Vietnam, could become a new vehicle for Moscow to assert its will. In its wake there was backlash against the Administration as a whole and Vance's State Department in particular for being "soft on Communism".⁵² This was a direct factor leading Carter to send Brzezinski to China in May to negotiate normalization of Sino-American relations, over Vance and Holbrooke's reservations. The Chinese proved more cooperative than the Vietnamese, and a timetable was quickly reached for normalization before the end of the year. In the process, Brzezinski and Chinese premier Huang Hua discussed the

importance of “assistance to Southeast Asian efforts to check Soviet support of Vietnamese expansionism”.⁵³

Analysts of U.S.-Vietnam relations unanimously attribute the ascendancy of the hawkish Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose Polish heritage bequeathed him with a fierce anti-Soviet attitude, over the moderate Cyrus Vance as the main factor retarding progress with Vietnam for the remainder of the Administration.⁵⁴ Although Brzezinski himself tries to play this down in his memoirs, he acknowledges that his disagreements with Vance stem from their “different backgrounds” which produce fundamentally “different estimate[s] of the proper balance between power and principle in our age.”⁵⁵ While the State Department continued to advocate for engagement with the U.S.S.R. through the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and normalization with Vietnam, Brzezinski sought instead to play the China card against the Soviet Union and contain Vietnam, whom he considered a budding “Cuba of the East”.⁵⁶ This was the main reason behind America’s failure to take advantage of the mellowing of the Vietnamese position in 1978.

However, with the notable exception of Steven Hurst, these experts then go on to date the demise of the U.S.-Vietnam normalization talks to early 1978, when the Sino-Vietnamese rift first became apparent.⁵⁷ There is a fundamental problem with this thesis, however: there is no documentary or testimonial record of Chinese leaders ever having explicitly pressured the Americans to halt normalization with Vietnam. Indeed, it would have made little sense for them to put forward such a request, because China had after all been the first nation to recognize Communist Vietnam in 1950, and maintained diplomatic relations with Vietnam until February 1979. Actually, documents recently compiled by the U.S. Office of the Historian reveal that even before sending the Woodcock Commission, President Carter had asked the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Huang Chen for his opinion. Huang replied, “We think this is good.”⁵⁸ The Americans would continue to consult China

throughout the normalization negotiations with Vietnam. Carter revealed in his memoirs that in “the early part of 1978, the Chinese sent word to me that they would welcome our moving toward Vietnam in order to moderate that country’s policies and keep it out of the Soviet camp... The China move was of paramount importance, so after a few weeks of assessment I decided to postpone the Vietnam effort until after we had concluded our agreement in Peking.”⁵⁹ As late as October 1978, when asked again by Cyrus Vance, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua stated categorically, “[Normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations] is a matter strictly for your two countries.”⁶⁰ A more nuanced reading, therefore, would be that while the Americans wished to honor Chinese sensibilities by giving precedence to its normalization process – after all, the Chinese had been waiting in line since 1973 – there was nothing to prevent normalization with Vietnam from occurring afterwards, *ceteris paribus*.

In taking this leisurely, hierarchical approach to normalization, the Carter Administration failed to appreciate how little time the Vietnamese had left. Already in 1977 periodic clashes had occurred at its disputed border with China, though not on the scale of clashes with Cambodia. In March 1978, the border talks broke down. In a top secret report Phan Hien resigned himself to the fact that “there is little chance the Chinese side wants to conclude a border agreement in the foreseeable future”.⁶¹ On March 24, Vietnam nationalized 30,000 businesses in the South, followed by the introduction of a new unified currency on May 3. As these twin decrees virtually wiped out the savings and properties of the wealthy Chinese community (alongside everyone else’s) overnight, they triggered a massive refugee exodus of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.⁶² Relations with Beijing continued to deteriorate throughout the summer as Vietnam sought to buttress its precarious position by moving towards the Soviet camp, joining the CMEA in June. An internal report stated clearly that China’s “hostile policy” was a main driving force for its change of heart regarding the CMEA.⁶³ In response, China suspended all aid to Vietnam on July 3, closed the border on July 11, and increased its aid to the Khmer Rouge.⁶⁴

The specter of a two-front war with China and Cambodia finally prompted Vietnamese leaders to prioritize security over development. In May 1978 the Vietnamese hinted that they would be willing to normalize relations with the U.S. without any conditions, but by this time Washington had become wary of Vietnam's growing coziness with Moscow. A Vietnamese goodwill mission to Honolulu to study American techniques for identifying recovered bodies and Sonny Montgomery's Congressional mission to Hanoi that produced a glowing report both failed to sway the Administration from its determination to put off Vietnamese normalization until after that with China.⁶⁵ On the same day that China closed its border with Vietnam, Phan Hien made the normalization without conditions position public.⁶⁶ In September Holbrooke met with another Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, to discuss this new position, and promised to relay the request to President Carter. The final reply, delivered by Holbrooke's deputy Robert Oakley on October 30, claimed that the border war with Cambodia, the refugee crisis, and Vietnam's relations with the U.S.S.R. – issues that had never before been raised during the negotiations – were now impediments to normalization.⁶⁷

Faced with lockout by the U.S. and fearing an imminent two-pronged attack by China and Cambodia, Vietnam threw in its lot with the Soviet camp and prepared for war. It signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union on November 2 that contained provisions in the event either side was attacked by a third party for “mutual consultations with the aim of eliminating this threat and of taking corresponding effective measures for the maintenance of the peace and security of their countries”.⁶⁸ China and the U.S. finally normalized relations on December 15, technically opening the door at last to resumption of the normalization process with Vietnam. But by this time, the Khmer Rouge had moved 19 divisions to the Vietnamese border and China had also militarized its border with Vietnam. Deciding that it could wait no longer, Vietnam commenced a preemptive invasion of Cambodia on December 25, capturing the capital Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.⁶⁹

Recently compiled documents have revealed how the U.S. belatedly attempted to prevent the conflict from blowing up into a full-scale regional war. When informed by Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping in January 1979 of his plans to undertake a punitive expedition to force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, Carter took a whole day to draft up for Deng a long list of reasons why he thought this was a bad idea, especially noting how it undermined their newly-signed relationship. His speech, while impassioned, was to no avail.⁷⁰ When the punitive expedition went ahead in February-March 1978, the U.S. publicly called for a joint Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.⁷¹ Though Carter's efforts were for naught, this episode proved that the U.S. was not deliberately trying to drive Vietnam and China towards war – quite the opposite, in fact.

As it turned out, Vietnam managed to halt the Chinese invasion with their militia and reserves, foiling Deng's plan. While the U.S. publicly chastised both powers, the difference was that normalization with China had been completed just in time, whereas now normalization with Vietnam was suspended for as long as Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia. In the aftermath of the Chinese invasion, Cyrus Vance made one last-ditch attempt to engage with the Vietnamese in May 1979, but these talks broke down in July 1979 when it became clear that Vietnam would not be able to make a strategically viable withdrawal from Cambodia.⁷² The Khmer Rouge leadership had succeeded in evading capture and by mid-year had regrouped and began their decade-long guerrilla resistance. The Vietnamese now found themselves saddled with a new Cambodian government far too weak to defend itself and bereft of means to restore a nation still staggering from the Khmer Rouge genocide.⁷³ Unwilling to abandon their position in Cambodia, Vietnam faced piling international sanctions, total economic dependence on the Soviet bloc, and the dashing of all of their postwar dreams.⁷⁴ Vietnam's long isolation had begun in earnest.

Epilogue and Conclusion

Washington maintained diplomatic and economic pressure against Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia throughout the 1980s. Military success against the Khmer Rouge insurgency, the end of the Sino-Soviet split and the Cold War, and comprehensive reforms at home all paved the way for Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. In the early 1990s fresh efforts were made to normalize relations with the U.S., which would only come in 1995, after Vietnam had already been admitted into ASEAN. Today, Vietnam and the United States are closer than ever. The U.S. is currently channeling technology to Vietnam to build several nuclear power plants, the U.S. Coast Guard is offering expertise to build up Vietnam's maritime defense capabilities, and Vietnam is negotiating to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, ostensibly an American-led Asia-Pacific trading bloc but also a core component of President Barack Obama's "Pivot to the East" strategy.

It has been a long and arduous road from war to reconciliation. This paper details the travails of the negotiations for the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations in the 1970s, when a great chance was missed. Many great scholars and diplomats have studied the causes of this failure, attributing blame first to the Vietnamese for being inflexible on aid and making a catastrophe of their public relations offensives. Later, the blame was shifted to Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular, who decided to prioritize normalization with China over Vietnam. By being insensitive to the mounting security pressures on Vietnam, these policies helped to create a climate of international hostility that drove Vietnam to seek Soviet protection, an important stepping stone towards the outbreak of the Third Indochina War.

But ultimately, I hope to transcend the blame game and help make some sense of the roles idealism, trust, domestic pressures, external pressures, and personalities play in the making or breaking of negotiations. While all of these ingredients need to be favorable for negotiations to succeed, having

just one unfavorable ingredient at any one time – a spying affair, a rigid Five-Year Plan, an intransigent Congress, an unfriendly third power, or a Brzezinski – can be enough to delay the process indefinitely. The story of the U.S.-Vietnam normalization negotiations in the 1970s is a story of failure, but it may still prove instructive to aspiring peacemakers today.

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