

**Cornell University Press**  
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Chapter Title: Land Reform and Agricultural Development, 1968—1975  
Chapter Author(s): Cao Văn Thân

Book Title: The Republic of Vietnam, 1955—1975  
Book Subtitle: Vietnamese Perspectives on Nation Building  
Book Editor(s): Tuong Vu, Sean Fear  
Published by: Cornell University Press, Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University. (2019)  
Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvq2w3nh.7>

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## CHAPTER FOUR

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# LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, 1968–1975

*Cao Văn Thân*

*Cao Văn Thân grew up in Saigon, attended French schools, and did his undergraduate and graduate studies in philosophy, law, and economics at French and American universities. After a tour of mandatory military service in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam for ten years, he worked as a lawyer, a judge at the Saigon Tribunal of First Instance, and an executive at Shell Petroleum of Vietnam, before beginning his teaching career in economics at different universities. From 1967 to 1974, he served the government of the RVN, first on President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's staff, then as minister of land reform and agricultural development, concurrently minister of rural development, responsible for implementing the Land to the Tiller program. In 1974, he resumed his academic career and moved to the Sorbonne in Paris. After the fall of Saigon, he moved to the University of Arizona. When he retired, he was professor and chair of the Department of Economics, Montana State University. He now lives in Montreal.*

This chapter focuses on major policies under President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu that transformed the countryside and contributed significantly to the economic development of South Vietnam in the last years of the war. These policies include land reform, an agricultural development program, price liberalization, and market stabilization. The policies practically eradicated land tenancy, reduced rural inequality by creating a large class of landowners, rapidly expanded production toward achieving food self-sufficiency, and stabilized market and consumption. This took place in the middle of a savage war and amounted to a successful rural revolution that has not been adequately acknowledged in the scholarship on the war. Rather than coercion and class struggle, our revolution was carried out based on a combination of economic incentives and new technologies that appealed to and benefited the majority of South Vietnamese farmers.

### THE LAND TO THE TILLER PROGRAM

Shortly after the 1968 communist Tết Offensive, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu appointed me minister of land reform and agricultural development, and later, concurrently, minister of rural development. I began accompanying Mr. Thiệu on his

frequent tours of the countryside, talking to the farmers and trying to understand and address the issues they faced. In early 1969, I was given responsibility for designing and implementing a new land-reform project to solve our deeply unpopular land tenancy situation.

The Republic of Vietnam, about the size of Missouri, was a poor country, ravaged by violence since the end of World War II. In 1954, peasants accounted for about 90 percent of the total population. This percentage decreased very slowly over time—by 1968, the population of 17.4 million was still 80 percent rural. Very few people in the countryside owned their own land, especially in the Mekong Delta, where 70 percent of all farmers had to pay rent.

We realized that land reform was of utmost urgency and importance. Indeed, Article 19 of the 1967 constitution enshrined an official policy of “making the people property owners” and provided that the state compensate landowners in a speedy and just manner at the market rate in case of expropriation for public purposes.<sup>1</sup> We were convinced we could craft a good land-reform program to faithfully adhere to Article 19 while benefiting our dirt-poor rural population.

Although some people assume this was an American idea, the land-reform initiative, known as Land to the Tiller (LTTT), was in fact conceived and implemented by Vietnamese alone. As U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker wrote to President Richard Nixon, “the basic concept of land distribution was done entirely by the Vietnamese on their own. The idea did not come from us, it came from President Thieu’s new, young and dynamic Minister of Land Reform and Agriculture, Cao Van Than.”<sup>2</sup>

I shared French journalist Bernard Fall’s analysis that land reform in South Vietnam was “as essential a factor to success in the Vietnam war as ammunition for howitzers.”<sup>3</sup> Although I am a strong believer in free markets and private enterprise, I was also convinced that redistribution to the poor and landless was the best way to redress the inequity of the agrarian system that we inherited from the past. History, I thought, would prove that this investment in our farmers would bring about significant returns in the near future, if free markets and private enterprise were allowed to operate.

I was determined that our new land-reform program would succeed. I felt I had to design an initiative that would meet the needs and desires of our landless peasants, and that was superior to the communists’ previous land reforms in the South, or in North Vietnam for that matter. Our program must be easily understood by the farmers and readily accepted by them. I must be able to explain to them our program. I would offer them new ideas. Of course, new ideas often meet resistance. But new, good ideas and fresh eyes can also make a big difference.

To prepare, I spent months visiting villages in central Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, talking with hundreds of farmers, listening to their hopes and grievances, and collecting as much information as possible about North Vietnamese and Việt Cộng land reform. I wanted to “carry the war to the enemy,” as Colonel Roger Trinquier, my unit commander in the French war against the Việt Minh, had advised. But I had to be realistic in estimating our ability to mobilize the necessary resources to finance our land-reform program.

Some members of the House of Representatives took issue with the name Land to the Tiller (or Người Cày Có Ruộng, NCCR), because the enemy had already used the same motto. I was happy to compromise on minor issues, but I insisted we keep the name, as it was a purely Vietnamese phrase rather than the Chinese-based name “Cải Cách Điền Địa” (land reform), which they preferred. It is worth mentioning that it was not the Việt Cộng who had invented the term NCCR. My reading of Lenin’s

works indicated that Vladimir Lenin had frequently talked about the tillers who must have the land. Several other countries had also chosen Land to the Tiller. I was finally able to persuade National Assembly members to accept the term.

The House of Representatives also disagreed with our proposed law because it called for the free distribution of arable land. Of course, the communists had already, if only verbally, granted free land to the rural poor, and I argued that we could hardly come up with any less if we were to compete against them. Our current approach was to sell expropriated land to farmers in installments, but I had learned that the delinquency rate on payments was close to 90 percent. Instead, I proposed free land for tenant farmers and, unlike the communists, land titles to guarantee their ownership.

Some House representatives were also strongly opposed to provisions issuing legal titles for land granted to farmers by the communists. The standing policy was that after our forces regained control of communist villages, communist land reform was immediately overturned. Farmers were forcibly evicted from their fields, and the land was turned back over to absentee landlords. Aware of the resentment this engendered, I pushed to discontinue the practice of reinstating absentee landlords, instead permitting farmers to remain on their communist-distributed land. We also froze land occupancy and rents in villages under temporary communist control while the new legislation was being drafted. Obviously, farmers would not be willing to pay distant landowners for fields that the communists had already promised belonged to them.

By June 1969, I had completed my proposal and presented it to President Thiệu, who submitted it to the National Assembly on July 1, 1969. After seven months of arduous deliberations, the National Assembly finally approved the proposal, now known as the LTTT program. President Thiệu signed it into law on March 26, 1970.

The final draft was five pages long, with twenty-two articles. Its objective was the elimination of land tenancy through the expropriation of land not directly cultivated by its owner. Expropriated land was to be delivered free of charge to the farmers themselves, with a maximum of three hectares per family in the Mekong Delta and one hectare in central Vietnam. Farmers who received the distributed land were required to cultivate it themselves and prohibited from transferring ownership for the first fifteen years. They were also exempted from registration fees and taxes on the land for the first year.

Of course, the landlords whose property was to be expropriated had to be fairly compensated. We developed the following formula: 20 percent of the expropriated land value was paid up front, in cash, and the remainder paid in eight-year bonds bearing 10 percent annual interest. In order to resolve disputes, we also established a special land court with jurisdiction over cases involving the LTTT law. The law also detailed punitive measures for anyone charged with preventing the implementation of our reforms.

Although the American media welcomed our endeavor, U.S. officials in South Vietnam had mixed feelings. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staff were not enthusiastic, and they doubted we could carry it out successfully. Our plans were totally different than any land-reform program they had seen before. Furthermore, they worried that compensating landlords would create a huge budget gap for the South Vietnamese government and that USAID would have to help fill the gap with even more financial aid. And indeed, the ten-year cost of the program was estimated at \$400 million.

However, the reception among the U.S. embassy personnel was favorable. Though they, too, were aware of the financial cost, they balanced this against the potential

political benefits. They were also more willing to take a chance on good ideas. U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker met with me many times during the LTTT implementation phase and always offered congratulations and encouragement: “keep doing an excellent job.” He also invited me to meet with visiting American congressional delegations, so they could learn firsthand about our progress.

These efforts helped persuade the American government to help with funding. In 1969, Ambassador Bunker signed an agreement whereby the United States would cover 10 percent of the estimated cost, beginning with an initial grant of \$10 million. These American funds were not to be paid to the landlords directly; instead, they would help finance the cost of imports from the United States. In 1970, another \$30 million was awarded, pending continued progress on implementation, and by 1973, the United States had contributed almost its full \$40 million share. The South Vietnamese government, on the other hand, had expended just over \$200 million worth of contributions.

Although the scale of American assistance was modest, it produced an important psychological effect. Most landlords doubted that we could deliver compensation without American financial backing (though few of them knew how little the United States was actually providing). U.S. support certainly helped reduce landlord opposition during the four years of the land-reform process.

It was generally agreed that the land problem was at the root of the conflict in Vietnam. In a March 31, 1968, editorial calling for land reform in South Vietnam, the *New York Times* projected that “virtually overnight, South Vietnam’s landless peasants would be given a stake to defend in their society. The Việt Cộng would be deprived of a gut issue. No military victory or political achievement would be more likely to move Hanoi toward the peace table than evidence of a substantial shift in peasant loyalty.”<sup>4</sup> Then, two weeks after our LTTT law was promulgated, on April 9, 1970, the same *New York Times* declared that our new land-reform program was “probably the most ambitious and progressive non-Communist land reform of the twentieth century.”<sup>5</sup>

The LTTT program included roughly one million hectares of land and involved some one million landless families. Given that the average family has six members, we can assume that roughly six million people stood to benefit. The success of the program depended on its swift implementation. In order to achieve this, we also adopted an entirely new set of revolutionary procedures, decentralizing the government and devolving authority onto elected officials in over two thousand rural villages.

We started with a massive training program beginning in early 1969 to instruct village officials on their new duties. Next, we embraced aerial photography in order to delineate plots of land, replacing the obsolete land register that had not been updated since the 1930s. This accelerated the process at least twentyfold. We also employed over fifty thousand armed Ministry of Rural Development cadres to identify farmers and assign land down to the hamlet level. These cadres played a critical role in implementing the LTTT program. Trained at the Vũng Tàu National Training Center, they were our civilian shock troops in the battle for hearts and minds. They lived in the areas where they were assigned and strove to form connections with the locals. Beyond land reform, they also assisted elected officials in the countryside with security, health care, education, and agricultural development.

To ease the burdens of paperwork, our team also established a series of special legal and administrative organs designed to bypass the usual bureaucratic backlog, with officials at the local, regional, and national level. Ours was an immense undertaking, and its complicated implementation required close and constant monitoring



at all levels. President Thiệu himself took a keen interest, reviewing our progress at monthly meetings and tasking each of four regional military commanders with responsibility for meeting implementation targets. Military cooperation was necessary, as rural security was essential if the program was to succeed. The Prime Minister's Office also appointed a top-ranking general to supervise the proceedings and to resolve any administrative bottlenecks.

With the full weight of government support behind the program, we were able to award title to over two hundred thousand hectares in the first year alone—equal to almost the entire hectarage distributed by previous South Vietnamese governments over the past twenty years. By the end of 1973, we had completed some 1.1 million hectares, almost 40 percent of the total cultivated land in South Vietnam.<sup>6</sup>

By 1974, land tenancy had practically disappeared in South Vietnam, and farmers' standard of living had significantly increased compared to the pre-land-reform period, thanks to a 30 percent increase in the value of agricultural output between 1968 and 1971.<sup>7</sup> Developments in agriculture—accounting for roughly one third of the gross national product—contributed to South Vietnam's overall economic growth, which averaged 8.6 percent between 1969 and 1971.

In short, our land-reform program had created among rural people a very large class of small landowners. Combined with agricultural modernization, landownership significantly reduced the degree of poverty and inequality in rural South Vietnam.

## THE GREEN REVOLUTION

I believe President Thiệu deep down was a farmer at heart. In addition to land reform, he also ordered me to launch an ambitious agricultural development program to jumpstart the agriculture-based economy and to consolidate the transformative gains that the long-deprived segment of our population had just obtained.

South Vietnam was an agrarian society since time immemorial, with abundant unexploited natural resources. Unlike the bloody agrarian reforms of the North, where tens of thousands of innocent people lost their property or even their lives, ours was a peaceful revolution—not a single landowner died as a result of the LTTT program. No other undertaking in the history of our country has ever brought about such a drastic change in rural landownership, or so improved the livelihood of farmers, by far the majority of our people.

I directed a massive five-year agricultural development plan, encompassing nine agricultural sectors and including some three dozen crop programs, as well as livestock, fisheries, and timber production. The plan was formally announced in 1970 by President Thiệu, in a landmark proclamation to the nation delivered in Long Xuyên Province. Mr. Thiệu announced that his administration would launch the five-year program to achieve three main objectives: satisfying the national demand for essential commodities; increasing rural standards of living; and expanding exports while reducing our dependence on imports in order to boost the local economy and generate foreign exchange.

Of the more than three dozen components of the first five-year plan, I considered the Accelerated Miracle Rice Production Program (AMRPP) to be the centerpiece. Rice production is of course an integral part of Vietnamese culture. More than just a staple of our diet, it lies at the center of our culture and our way of life. And in the annals of economic development of Vietnam there has never been any agricultural

development program that is grander in scope, more complex in implementation, more remarkable in impact, and more successful in outcome than the AMRPP.

One of the most significant developments in the history of food production was the discovery by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) of new high-yield rice varieties in the 1960s. This innovation was at the heart of the global “Green Revolution,” which helped make the problem of starvation a thing of the past. The international scientists working at the IRRI learned how to hybridize several new varieties of high-yield and short-maturation rice. This doubled, then tripled, and then even quadrupled the normal yield of existing native local varieties of rice, revolutionizing the world’s most important crop almost overnight. By shortening rice maturation times from between 120 and 140 days to between just 90 and 100 days, they allowed for multiple harvests within the two traditional growing seasons. These scientists also developed short, sturdy rice plants, less susceptible to damage from the wind and rain. The new rice also absorbed more fertilizer, allowing it to grow faster and produce more grain. They also invented long-stem varieties, capable of accommodating more deeply flooded fields, and even produced pest- and disease-resistant strains, and plants capable of withstanding high levels of salt or acidity, a major problem in estuaries like the Mekong Delta.

South Vietnam was fortunate to have been given the opportunity to participate in the field trials of these varieties on a national scale, beginning in 1967. In a land disrupted by a destructive insurgency fomented by international communism, which wreaked havoc on its food production, rapid large-scale agricultural changes were urgent indeed, especially with American aid for food imports beginning to taper.

To emphasize his determination to launch the Green Revolution, and to signal its importance to rank-and-file administrators, President Thiệu made sure he was seen wading knee-deep in the mud, planting miracle rice, and showing off new portable harvesting machines. He also personally distributed land titles across the country. Miracle rice production was added to his list of overall pacification and development goals, and he took care to personally monitor its progress. At monthly meetings at different military regions of the country where the highest military and civilian authorities were gathered, he paid keen attention to land distribution to farmers and to acreage of miracle rice production as much as the number of enemy soldiers killed and villages secured or villagers liberated.

Nothing was more effective at delivering change than the direct support of the president. I accompanied him on monthly high-level inspection tours and enlisted the help of the provincial and regional military authorities to clear administrative bottlenecks wherever we faced impediments to reform. Military security was often the most intractable problem, especially in far-flung corners of the country, and Mr. Thiệu’s direct orders to regional commanders helped ensure that these challenges were promptly confronted.

Beyond even LTTT, the AMRPP was indeed the biggest and most ambitious civilian effort undertaken by the government. All key government organizations were involved, although the Ministry for Land Reform and Agricultural Development took the lead. Eight out of nine agricultural directorates were involved, and at its height, the program occupied eighteen thousand out of twenty thousand agricultural directorate employees—this was the biggest civilian branch in the entire government.

Rice, especially the new high-yield varieties, is a very tedious and demanding crop to produce because of the exacting requirements of many factors involved in the processes. These include proper land preparation, selecting the appropriate seeds for each

particular field, nurturing the seedlings, correctly timing insecticide and herbicide application, managing water levels, applying suitable fertilizers for each type of soil, forecasting the weather, managing animal and human labor, investing in machinery, and, finally, harvesting, transporting, storing, processing, and selling the rice, all of which requires ready credit and military security.

At the height of this program, tens of thousands of the Ministry of Land Reform and Agricultural Development technocrats of all levels—central, provincial, and regional—along with rural development cadres in every province, were intricately involved in a multitude of daily tasks. We made plans, implemented our ideas, trained cadres and farmers, carried out research, supervised support workers, conducted inspections, corrected errors, and drafted and filed reports. My job was like conducting a symphony orchestra, with each step of the process requiring precision timing given the demands of the rice-growing cycle. It was a feat rarely seen in the history of agriculture due to the unpredictable nature of the weather, our limited financial resources, and the paucity of manpower of an underdeveloped country at war.

Other ministries and government agencies provided varying degrees of assistance. The Ministry of Economy prioritized its scarce foreign exchange for the import of vital goods such as fertilizer, insecticides and herbicides, farm equipment, and machinery. It was also responsible for rice-marketing policies that would incentivize farmers to increase production. This marked a change from years of disastrous policy, which had reduced peasants to subsistence farming and resulted in food shortages, hoarding, inflation, speculation, the disruption of traditional rural and urban life, and plummeting military and civilian morale.

In 1973, a cabinet reshuffling resulted in a new rice-marketing approach that favored rural producers over urban consumers. To understand why this new marketing policy was important one just needs to look at the Philippines where miracle rice originated and where the Green Revolution first started but whose rice-marketing policy has favored urban consumers. To this day the Philippines still imports large quantities of rice annually to feed its urban population. The rice-marketing policy we implemented in 1973 in South Vietnam brought about an upsurge in the production of commercial high-yield varieties of rice throughout the land and moved us closer toward the goal of self-sufficiency. So desirable was our rice that communist insurgents began smuggling seeds to the North in order to bolster their own poor food production rates.

Meanwhile, to help farmers fund their investments, the central bank and Ministry of Finance oversaw a program whereby rural banks awarded small loans, averaging \$50, to purchase high-yield seeds, farm equipment, pumps and motors, and fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides. This expansion of rural credit had an immediate transformational effect on the countryside as many farmers were able to move from subsistence to commercial rice farming. The sight of small wooden boats, powered by imported shrimp tail motors, crisscrossing the canals carrying goods to the markets was most uplifting.

It began in earnest when the Agricultural Development Bank of Vietnam (ADBV) started the Rural Bank program in 1969, opening and cosponsoring four rural banks along with private investors. The aim was to provide banking services and credit down to the hamlet level in rural areas where there had never been a commercial bank presence. Nguyễn Đăng Hải served as the general manager of the project, and by 1974 he had increased the number of rural banks to eighty-six.



Each rural bank was a separate entity, just like any other commercial bank, and under the control of the National Bank of Vietnam. It has its own board of directors elected by shareholders and had to apply to the National Bank to obtain a license. As a special sponsor and co-owner of the rural banks, the ADBV held training courses for the employees and boards of directors of each branch, to ensure that the rural banks upheld shareholder interests and abided by the law. The ADBV also conducted routine surprise audits to monitor compliance.

Meanwhile, the Ministries of Defense and the Interior played an important role by providing rural security. They launched military operations timed to accompany the harvest, and allowed for deferments for conscripted agronomists during the most critical stages of the growing season. Some fifty thousand rural development cadres also stepped up to help ease chronic manpower shortages stemming from the military draft.

South Vietnam was one of the first few countries to test these new varieties of miracle rice, and because there were more than half a dozen varieties, we had to plant them on a trial-and-error basis to determine the most appropriate strain for each region. It was a time-consuming proposition at best, fraught with difficulties and frequent failures. On top of this, our seeds came from the Philippines, which forbade the export of the new varieties, severely inhibiting our efforts. It took direct intervention by President Lyndon Johnson before we received our first batch, which meant working overtime at our research stations to proliferate this initial sample. But our team was determined, and fortunately, we were blessed by clement weather during the first few harvests.

Even before miracle rice, Vietnam already had almost nine hundred varieties of rice, some of them very unique and precious. Persuading conservative farmers to abandon their time-tested favorites for our new experimental seeds took some doing. One of our favorite schemes to entice farmers was to order rural development cadres to sleep outdoors, next to the miracle rice plots. Convinced that anything so closely guarded must be very valuable, farmers began stealing the miracle seeds to test on their own, whereupon they were quickly won over. They would steal some of these seeds for use at their land for seed multiplication for the next planting season. The ploy succeeded well beyond our expectations.

A more transparent approach was simply to show by example. When farmers saw their neighbors growing wealthy practically overnight, their resistance crumbled. A farmer in the Mekong Delta with three hectares of land after two harvests of miracle rice would produce about twenty-four tons of paddy a year.<sup>8</sup> Selling at 10,000 Đồng per one hundred kilograms of rice and assuming that one hundred kilograms of paddy produces seventy-five kilograms of rice, this would provide the farmer a significant profit usually equal to 30 percent of gross income.

The impact of this massive agricultural development was far-reaching. It helped lift the peasant majority out of abject poverty almost overnight, turning society's most disenfranchised into a fledgling rural middle class. Our estimates suggested that income in the countryside doubled and in some cases quadrupled following the advent of miracle rice.

As a result of these initiatives, we recorded a surge in miracle rice acreage to nine hundred thousand hectares by 1973, a total that did not include the no-doubt significant adaptation beyond our official program. Expanding paddy production and processing activities also contributed to a surge in meat, poultry, and fish production as well. It was by any account a tremendous accomplishment at a time of ongoing

warfare. A thriving middle class began to emerge just a couple of years after completion of the LTTT program. It brought South Vietnam back to rice self-sufficiency as early as 1975 after almost a decade of rice imports that amounted to as much as six hundred thousand metric tons a year.

### PRICE LIBERALIZATION AND MARKET STABILIZATION

Production was only half of the challenge. The other half, just as critical to the success of the program, was financing, collection, storage, and distribution. Rice would not move from the farmer to the consumer in the cities at competitive prices unless we could resolve satisfactorily these critical issues of the second half. Responsibility for marketing rice fell within the purview of the Ministry of Economy, later known as the Ministry of Trade and Industry.<sup>9</sup>

The rice trade had traditionally been controlled by a small handful of rice merchants. Over the years, they had developed a network of collection, transportation, financing, and storage. But partly due to the war, this network began to erode, to the detriment of farmers and urban consumers alike. The rice supply was constantly disrupted by military activities and enemy sabotage, and hindered by checkpoints intended to withhold rice from enemy hands. Hoarding and price speculation were rampant.

By 1973, the situation was in crisis. That summer, Vice Minister of Agriculture Trần Quang Minh was summoned to the presidential palace for breakfast. Over a bowl of phở, he was told in no uncertain terms by the president himself that the problem had to be resolved immediately. His solution was the establishment of strategic rice reserves in rice-deficit regions, similar to the strategic petroleum reserve in the United States, which was at that time dealing with the shortage of oil due to the oil embargo imposed by OPEC following the Yom Kippur War.

Following the meeting, Trần Quang Minh was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, where he was to head the newly established National Food Administration tasked with solving the recurring rice crisis. In addition to the strategic reserve concept, the National Food Administration considered a number of options, from lifting price controls and removing military checkpoints, to increasing access to finance for farmers and merchants.

The first two measures were politically risky, given the ongoing war, and the winners and losers of liberalized pricing were unclear. But the status quo was not working, and we decided to take a chance on all four measures. To that end, we waived price controls, removed the checkpoints, encouraged commercial banks to invest in the countryside, and set up a three hundred thousand ton rice reserve in chronically deficient central Vietnam. This helped reduce annual shipments from the South from forty thousand to just seven thousand tons. By late 1974, we had managed to stabilize the situation.

### IN REFLECTION

Looking back, I believe that the Second Republic succeeded in delivering a complete rural revolution in the space of just five years. It was achieved without bloodshed, during a period of the most intense warfare. Credit for this spectacular accomplishment undoubtedly belongs to the visionary leadership of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu.

## NOTES

- 1 Tổng Bộ Thông Tin Chiêu Hồi, *Hiến Pháp Việt Nam Cộng Hòa ban hành ngày 1 tháng 4 năm 1967* [The constitution of the Republic of Vietnam issued on April 1st, 1967] (Saigon, 1967), 17.
- 2 Douglas Pike, ed., *The Bunker Papers* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California–Berkeley, 1990), 3:667.
- 3 Bernard Fall, “Viet Nam in the Balance,” *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 1 (October 1966): 5.
- 4 “Muddling through in Vietnam,” *New York Times*, March 31, 1968, E12.
- 5 Editorial, *New York Times*, April 9, 1970, 40.
- 6 See Douglas C. Dacy, *Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development, South Vietnam, 1955–1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 113.
- 7 *Ibid.*, table 3-2, 41 and 58.
- 8 This assumes that the yield was four tons per hectare per harvest.
- 9 This section was written in consultation with Dr. Trần Quang Minh, former vice minister of agriculture, and Nguyễn Đức Cường, former minister of trade and industry (see chapter 1 in this volume).